

AN EMPIRICAL COMPARISON OF SOVIET¹ AND AMERICAN BUSINESS NEGOTIATIONS

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Abstract. Fifty-six Soviet businesspeople and 160 American businesspeople participated in simulated *intracultural*, one-on-one, buyer-seller negotiations. All participants completed questionnaires after the negotiation sessions, and six negotiators from each cultural group were videotaped during the interactions. Analysis of the questionnaire data indicated that Soviet negotiators achieved higher individual profits when using a competitive approach in negotiations. This result is in contrast to a more cooperative approach associated with higher profits for the American participants. Analysis of the videotapes suggests both similarities and differences in observed bargaining behaviors across the two cultural groups.

In the market economy, what will be produced, who gets it, and how it will be exchanged is determined and organized by *bargaining* over price and other attributes (the invisible hand of Adam Smith) rather than by

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command (the "visible hand" of government) or *tradition* (the "dead hand" of the past), which is mainly related to reciprocal exchange among relatives, friends, and clan members. [Boddewyn & Falco 1988, p. 32]

During the months this article has been in review, political and economic systems in the Soviet Union have been changing at unpredictably accelerating rates. Before 1988, all international trade was exclusively controlled by a few dozen foreign trade organizations (FTOs). Foreign companies buying from or selling to Soviet state enterprises² were required to negotiate with FTO personnel as well as enterprise representatives. In April of that year, Gorbachev began to allow foreigners to call directly on enterprise managers; almost immediately, more than 5,000 Soviet state enterprises applied for direct trading rights. At this writing, it appears that the Soviet Union is about to disappear as a federal organization, thereby further opening the commercial system to foreign participation.

The transition toward a market economy is not an easy one for enterprises in the Soviet Union or for the Western firms seeking to enter into exchange relationships with them. One of the key problems is a general lack of understanding regarding the fundamental business process [Graham et al. 1988] of face-to-face buyer-seller negotiations. FTO representatives understood the Western business system quite well. However, at the enterprise level, managers have virtually no experience with Western style commercial negotiations [*Economist* 1989; Carvounis & Carvounis 1989].

Several researchers have described how culture influences business negotiation processes and outcomes. In order for American firms and Soviet enterprises to achieve potential commercial successes, managers from both cultures must understand the negotiation styles (i.e., the behaviors, attitudes, and expectations) of their exchange partners. Such an understanding is critical, if not imperative, because it enables each side to better predict the negotiation partner's behavior and/or tactics. Greater accuracy in terms of predicting the negotiation partner's behavior and tactics allows each side to modify its negotiation stance accordingly and achieve greater returns.

This study, as a first step in building that mutual understanding, compares the business negotiation approaches of American and Soviet managers. The study is important and unique because it reports findings from a negotiation simulation conducted in the Soviet Union, using primarily Soviet enterprise managers as participants. No previous studies of Soviet negotiation style have taken such an empirical approach. Aside from the practical purpose of producing knowledge regarding management behaviors in one of the largest countries in the world, the choice of the Soviet/American comparison is important theoretically as well. Herein we examine the robustness of American management theories in a setting culturally and politically isolated and disparate.

Briefly, 56 Soviet businesspeople and 160 American businesspeople participated in simulated intracultural, one-on-one, buyer-seller negotiations. All participants completed questionnaires after the negotiation sessions. Six of

the Soviet and six of the American negotiators were videotaped for a more detailed, exploratory analysis of the negotiation processes. Below the theoretical perspective of the study is described, followed by a brief review of the pertinent literature on Soviet negotiation behaviors. Next, methods and results are reported in two phases: (1) analyses of the questionnaire data and (2) analyses of the videotapes. The final section of the paper comprises a discussion and integration of both phases of the study.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Social psychological theories [Rubin & Brown 1975; Sawyer & Guetzkow 1965; Thibaut & Kelley 1959] and exchange theories³ [Bagozzi 1978; Homans 1974]—wherein the model that negotiation outcomes (consequent) are determined by situational factors (antecedent) and negotiation process (concurrent)—provide the theoretical perspective underlying all the relations among constructs considered in this study. Briefly, situational factors such as variation in cultural background, bargainer characteristics, and process variables such as negotiators' approach and interpersonal attraction have been found to influence or affect the outcomes (e.g., profits, satisfaction, etc.). In Figure 1 are presented the constructs and relationships considered in the study. The discussion below follows the model from right to left.


Negotiation Outcomes

In the hundreds of bargaining experiments conducted prior to this research, a commonly used measure of negotiation outcomes is profits (both individual and joint) attained by bargainers in negotiation simulations (cf. Rubin & Brown [1975]; e.g., Clopton [1984]; Dwyer & Walker [1981]). Rather than a focus on joint profits, our view is that individuals should (and usually will) try to maximize their own economic rewards while attempting to keep partners satisfied. That is, negotiators really are involved in a difficult balancing act between maximizing *their own profits* and *the satisfaction of their clients*. Such a view of key negotiation outcomes is consistent with the views of several authors (e.g., Fisher & Ury [1981]; Weitz [1978]).

Negotiation Process Variables

Problem-Solving Approach. The problem-solving approach (hereafter PSA) to business negotiations involves first an emphasis on questions and getting information from clients about their needs and preferences. The focus is on cooperation and an integrative approach, whereby the needs of both parties are honestly discussed and eventually satisfied. Hence, a PSA can be defined concisely as a set of negotiation behaviors that are cooperative, integrative, and information-exchange-oriented. Such strategies tend to maximize the number of alternative solutions considered, thus allowing negotiators to optimize outcomes.

FIGURE 1
A Model of Business Negotiations*



*Relationships among shaded constructs are tested in this study.

The relationship of a problem-solving approach and negotiation outcomes has been investigated frequently during the last twenty years. Different researchers have used different labels for the PSA concept (i.e., integrative bargaining strategies, Walton & McKersie [1965]; cooperative orientation, Rubin & Brown [1975]; problem-solving orientation, Pruitt & Lewis [1975] and Menkel-Meadow [1984]; representational bargaining strategies, Angelmar & Stern [1978]; direct/open influence tactics, Weitz [1981]; a customer orientation, Saxe & Weitz [1982]), but findings have been relatively consistent. Generally, PSA has been found to influence *joint* negotiation outcomes positively. Graham [1986] investigated relationships between PSA and negotiator's *individual* profit and their bargaining partner's satisfaction. Consistent with several studies reviewed by Rubin and Brown [1975], statistically significant relationships were discovered between a negotiator's PSA and partner's satisfaction with the negotiation and between the partner's PSA and the negotiator's individual profit. Our study is in part a replication of that research (with Soviet negotiators) and, therefore, the following hypotheses are proposed:

- H1: Negotiator's individual profits are positively related to his or her bargaining partner's use of a problem-solving approach.
- H2: Partner's satisfaction is positively related to negotiator's use of a problem-solving approach.

In both cases, bargainers who encourage partners to provide information about themselves and their needs and preferences can be expected to achieve more favorable negotiation outcomes. Findings consistent with Hypotheses 1 and 2 are reported by Adler, Graham and Schwarz [1987] for Anglophone and Francophone Canadian bargainers. Results consistent with Hypothesis 2 are reported by Campbell et al. [1988] for German negotiators and by Graham et al. [1988] for American and Korean negotiators.

Similarly, the influence of negotiator's approach (i.e., behavior and attitudes) on his or her partner's negotiation approach is also investigated in this study. Rubin and Brown [1975] and Weitz [1978] suggest the importance of adjusting one's bargaining tactics according to one's impressions of the opponent's negotiation style. Specifically, Weitz suggests that adaptive behavior will enhance bargaining effectiveness. Rubin and Brown posit high adaptability coupled with cooperativeness will favor higher negotiation outcomes. The following hypothesis is suggested:

- H3: Negotiator's use of problem-solving negotiation strategies is positively related to his or her bargaining partner's use of problem-solving negotiation strategies.

Pruitt and Kimmel [1977] describe the mechanism involved in Hypothesis 3 as reciprocation. When negotiators give information about needs and preferences, their partners will be likely to reciprocate. Gouldner [1960] explains that a

“reciprocity norm” establishes a stable set of mutual rewards that guides interactions such as negotiations. Pruitt [1981], Putnam and Jones [1982a], and Walton and McKersie [1965] are among several other researchers who describe a tendency of negotiators to imitate or match one another’s bargaining strategies. Findings consistent with Hypothesis 3 are reported for negotiators from Japan, America, and Korea [Graham et al. 1988], from Canada (Anglophones only), and from Mexico [Adler et al. 1987].

Lastly, Walton and McKersie [1965] suggest that the opposite of problem-solving strategies is distributive bargaining strategies, wherein the goal is to change a bargaining partner’s attitudes, attributions, or actions. An example of a distributive or instrumental appeal is Angelmar and Stern’s [1978] “threat” content category. Threats are viewed by researchers as subtracting from the recipient’s utility of a particular alternative, which potentially moves the recipient (partner) closer to the threatener’s (negotiator’s) more favorable alternatives [Walton and McKersie 1965]. Consequently, bargainers using distributive or instrumental strategies can be expected to achieve higher individual negotiation outcomes. Weiss and Stripp [1984] hypothesize that Chinese, French, Mexican, Nigerian, Saudi Arabian, and American negotiators tend (albeit in differing degrees) toward distributive bargaining. Graham et al. [1988] report an inverse relationship between negotiator’s profits and problem-solving strategies for Chinese businesspeople on Taiwan, as do Campbell et al. [1988] for negotiators from Germany and the United Kingdom, and Adler et al. [1987] for negotiators from Mexico and Canada (Francophones only).

H4: Negotiator’s individual profits are inversely related to his or her own use of problem-solving negotiation strategies.⁴

Interpersonal Attraction. Another important construct considered by others is interpersonal attraction. Simons, Berkowitz and Moyer [1970, p. 9] suggest “the relationship between attraction to a source (like-dislike, friendly feelings, etc.) and attitude change has received scant attention.” Rubin and Brown [1975], in their review of the negotiation literature, conclude that, generally, interpersonal attraction enhances bargaining outcomes. Therefore, to the extent that a person receives rewards from a relationship with someone s/he perceives as attractive, that person will be more satisfied with the negotiation outcome.

H5: Partner’s satisfaction with the negotiation outcome is positively related to interpersonal attraction.

Broad support for Hypothesis 5 is provided across cultural groups. Bargaining partner’s satisfaction has been found to be positively related to negotiator’s attractiveness for business people from France and Germany [Campbell et al. 1988], from America, Taiwan, Japan and Korea [Graham et al. 1988], and from Canada (Anglophones only) and from Mexico [Adler et al. 1987].

Conversational Form. The problem-solving approach is a construct developed primarily by social psychologists and principally refers to the content of conversations. Alternatively, linguistic theory holds that consideration of only verbal *content* yields inadequate understandings of interpersonal interactions. Sociolinguists emphasize the importance of the *form* of conversation. They focus on the nonverbal and structural aspects of language that provide the necessary ancillary information for accurate interpretation of the *content* of conversations.

Simply stated, the content of conversation is *what* is said, while the form is *how* it is said. The distinction is both theoretically and practically a "fuzzy" one. Several researchers have developed schemes for categorizing the *what* aspects of negotiations (e.g., Bales [1950]; Douglas [1962]; Pennington [1968]; Walton & McKersie [1965]; Pruitt & Lewis [1975]; Bonoma & Felder [1977]; Angelmar & Stern [1978]; Donohue [1981]; Putnam & Jones [1982b]) and have used these schemes to analyze the verbal content of bargaining interactions.

The *how* of meaning has also been considered. Ethnomethodologists emphasize communication must be considered as an integrated whole made up of content and form. Authors in other fields also emphasize the importance of communication form. For example, Bonoma and Felder [1977] and Soldow and Thomas [1984] offer alternative definitions of form—nonverbal behaviors and relational communication, respectively. However, in previous negotiation studies, form has usually been "taken for granted." So, in the present study, both content and form are considered. Because of constraints discussed in detail in a later section, we cannot test hypotheses regarding communication form. Instead, *propositions* are stated and their associated relationships are presented in Figure 1 for the sake of completeness. Additionally, data are presented that suggest differences in form between Americans and Soviets may indeed be salient and prove so in future studies.

Discrepancies in conversational form, although more likely to exist in cross-cultural interactions, may also adversely affect intracultural interactions. Since such differences in conversational form can cause lack of communication and, worse yet, miscommunication [Poyatos 1988], we might expect discrepancies between negotiators' conversational forms to make cooperation more difficult. That is, a problem-solving approach depends upon *accurate* communication between negotiators.

P6: Discrepancies in conversational form will be inversely related to the problem-solving approaches used by negotiators.

Discrepancies in conversational form can also cause lower levels of interpersonal attraction. McGuire [1968] and others suggest that similarity in personal characteristics and behaviors will enhance relationships (cf. Adler & Graham [1989]).



P7: Discrepancies in conversational form will be inversely related to the attractiveness of the negotiators.

Situational Factors

Intercultural vs. Intracultural Negotiations. Gumperz [1979] suggests that humans while interacting also provide stylistic signals for interpretation of verbal communications through the use of what he calls contextualization cues. He explains:

Our hypothesis is that conversational inference, i.e., the process by which speakers interpret what is intended by a conversational contribution, is in part determined by a system of conventional discourse-level verbal and non-verbal signals. These signals, termed "contextualization cues," serve to signal the way in which any conversation contribution is to be understood, in light of the participants' expectations and the situation at hand.
[p. 2]

An example of a contextualization cue might be a rise in tone of voice to indicate or underline an important point. Gumperz and his associates have also found that contextualization cues vary across cultures. They are behaviors learned in the course of the individual's socialization. Further, he suggests that differences in these cues are often the cause of misunderstandings which can have serious consequences in cross-cultural interactions (e.g., terminated negotiations).

Elements of conversational form that have been found to vary across cultures are legion (cf. Poyatos [1988]; Gumperz [1979]). For example, Graham [1985] reports that Brazilian negotiators appear to have a more *aggressive* style of conversation than with Japanese or American bargainers. In simulated negotiations, Brazilians used the words "no" and "you" more frequently, the former providing a negative tone, the latter providing a presumptuous tone vis-a-vis the Japanese and American behaviors. The Brazilian nonverbal behaviors also differed from the Japanese and Americans—no silent periods and far more interruptions, and facial gazing occurred. So, based upon the literature in this vein, we propose:

P8: Discrepancies between negotiators' conversational forms will be greater in intercultural interactions than in intracultural interactions.

SOVIET NEGOTIATION BEHAVIOR

Caveats about the Literature

Due to the nature of world politics in the last few decades, the English language literature on formal state-to-state negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States far exceeds that on commercial trade negotiations between these two nations. Consequently Beliaev, Mullen and Punnett

[1985, p. 103] lament that "there is little information available to guide U.S. business executives in understanding the cultural environment of negotiations with their Soviet counterparts." Not only is the literature marked by a paucity of knowledge about this topic, it is further confounded by conflicting versions and sometimes diametrically opposite characterizations. Since a majority of such publications are based on personal experience and/or anecdotal evidence, such inconsistencies are not surprising.

The subject of this paper is business negotiations. However, several authors have suggested that fundamental driving forces influence traits and behaviors of Soviet negotiators across all negotiation situations—commercial, political and arms reduction talks (cf. Sloss & Davis [1987]; Von Czege [1983]). Also, though in the Soviet Union dramatic changes have taken place, the literature pertains mostly to the pre-Gorbachev era(s). Nevertheless, it is our contention that the literature is still quite relevant and useful. In interpreting present-day Soviet values and actions, you cannot ignore Russian society, Marxist ideology, and the impact of the Soviet state. Hence, for example, while commitment to the collective or socialist ideology is on the wane due to Gorbachev's *perestroika*, *glasnost* and more recent events, it may take a while before such a philosophy can be eradicated, if at all, from the culture of the Soviet people:

all individual or collective actions of Soviet negotiators are overwhelmingly influenced by the state and the state ideology. The emphasis on individual behavior, which is culturally 'in the blood' of Americans, leads to a tendency for them to underestimate the pervasiveness of the Soviet state in the consciousness and behavior of every Soviet person. It is necessary to realize that the Soviet people take virtually no step, in their public or private lives, which does not depend on the state. [Beliaev et al. 1985]

Therefore, in the discussion of Soviet negotiation processes below, relevant material from the literature regarding arms and political negotiations will be included.

Finally, considered in the literature are a wide variety of aspects of Soviet negotiations. However, this study is more narrowly focused, and three themes taken from the broader literature are particularly pertinent here—distributive bargaining strategies, information greed, and the importance of personal relationships.

Distributive Bargaining Strategies

The several descriptions of Soviets at the negotiation table do not fit the problem-solving model. The appellations are somewhat different across authors, but the overall picture is relatively clear—the Soviets have tended toward a distributive approach to negotiations: "competitive" [Schmidt 1978]; "inflexible" [Gorlin 1979; Stowell 1975]; "stubborn" [Sloss & Davis 1987]; "confrontational" [Lefebvre 1982, 1983, 1986; Lefebvre & Lefebvre 1986a, 1986b; Marquand 1989; Sloss & Davis 1987; Schmidt

1978]; “uncompromising” [Lefebvre 1982, 1983, 1986; Lefebvre & Lefebvre 1986a, 1986b; Sloss & Davis 1987; Von Czege 1983]; “tough” [Carvounis & Carvounis 1989; Goldman 1978; Gorlin 1979; Schmidt 1978]; “hard” [Carvounis & Carvounis 1989; Knight 1987; Vlachoutsikos 1986, 1989]; and “rigid” [Gorlin 1979; Von Czege 1983]. Three distinct explanations are offered in the literature:

(1) Several authors suggest that *bureaucratic/organizational* constraints lead to a more distributive approach [Beliaev, Mullen & Punnett 1985; Carvounis & Carvounis 1989; Gorlin 1979; Lipson 1978; Schmidt 1978; Sloss & Davis 1987; Vlachoutsikos 1989]. For example, American business executives have observed that the difficulty of obtaining concessions from the Soviets “is a product of centralized decision making” and “not a negotiating tactic but a product of the Soviet economy’s inherent inflexibility” [Gorlin 1979, p. 100].

(2) Schmidt’s [1978, p. 11] cautionary note,

The visiting negotiator must realize that he is not confronting a profit and loss oriented adversary, nor meeting a man who seeks personal satisfaction in outbargaining. Instead he is facing global politics in action. The struggle is over worldwide interests that are economic, political, and social. This orientation dictates the Soviet strategy, which is not aimed at compromise, but at the highly skilled, well-directed management of conflict

neatly sums up the arguments of some authors [Gorlin 1979; Sloss & Davis 1987] who find the *ideological differences* between the Americans and the Soviets to be the main reason behind this Soviet negotiating attitude even in commercial trade negotiations.

(3) An even more interesting hypothesis for the “uncompromising” characteristic of the Soviets proposed by the Lefebvres is that the Americans and Soviets are governed by two *different “ethical systems”* [1982, 1983, and 1986, 1986a and 1986b]. According to them, the Western cultures are dominated by the “first ethical system” under which individuals seek compromises to resolve conflicts with both their partners and adversaries as that is considered “positive” behavior. However, “positive” behavior to the Soviets who are governed by the “second ethical system” is for individuals to try to either create new conflicts or exacerbate existing ones with adversaries. Hence, Lefebvre [1983, p. 7] explains

The American and Soviet people are not similar: their ethical attitudes do not coincide; they evaluate people’s behavior differently. Something that an American considers normative positive behavior (for example, negotiating and reaching a compromise with an enemy, and even any deal with another individual), a Soviet man perceives as showing Philistine cowardice, weakness, as something unworthy (the word “deal” itself has a strong negative connotation in contemporary Russian).

Relatedly, an issue that sharply divides the literature is the question of whether the Soviets engage in deliberate, irrational and unfair manipulations

during the negotiation process [Knight 1987; Sloss & Davis 1987; Stowell 1975; U.S. Department of Commerce 1977; Von Czege 1983] or if such deviances are system-related and hence not only inevitable, and legitimate, but also rational [Carvounis & Carvounis 1989; De Pauw 1979; Gorlin 1979; Lipson 1978; Schmidt 1978; Vlachoutsikos 1989]. The subject of such disagreement in the field is the repeated observation of Soviet actions such as the last minute cancellation of long-scheduled meetings, provision of little or no clerical and administrative support services to the negotiating partners, changes of agenda and venues frequently, switching negotiation team leaders unexpectedly, "whipsawing," "tirade," using monopoly buyer status as a bargaining leverage, and engaging in overall delay tactics while expecting the other party to be not only on time, but also straightforward and honest.

On the basis of an empirical study of Soviet emigrants' and middle class Americans' responses to several hypothetical situations, the Lefebvres' [1982, 1983, 1986, 1986a and 1986b] conclude that "*the majority of former Soviet citizens consider it acceptable to use bad means to achieve good goals . . . and . . . the majority of Americans disagree with this*" [1983, p. 6]. For example, in their study they report that while 70% of Soviet emigrants agree with the statement, "A good person in a situation of conflict with an insolent person would not seek compromise with him," only 24% of the Americans in their sample do. The following statements are also consistent with the Lefebvres' findings: "although the Soviets seem to expect rational, consistent behavior from their American counterparts, they themselves do not always feel bound by Western business norms" [Knight 1987, p. 123], and "every characteristic of the Soviet negotiating form is a tactic and that these tactics together constitute a very rational negotiating form" [Gorlin 1979, p. 100]. Contrarily, attestations such as "strict and above-board conduct has always been one of the hallmarks of the Ministry of Foreign Trade" [Carvounis & Carvounis 1989, p. 80] well represent the opposing views. Because of these discrepant descriptions, further systematic and empirical investigations are needed to provide a better understanding regarding alleged Soviet "manipulation."

Information Greed

Most authors describe the Soviets as information hungry and detail-oriented. Several different explanations are offered: Some suggest a contributing factor is the "desire of the Soviets to learn as much as possible from Western technology" [Carvounis & Carvounis 1989; Gorlin 1979; Schmidt 1978; Stowell 1975]. Others consider this to be directly related to the complexity of the Soviet bureaucracy including factors like multiple layers of decision-making, ministerial overlap and goal conflicts, tenuous lines of internal communication, specialization and hence lack of complete information available to any one individual [Giffen 1971; Gorlin 1979; Knight 1987;

Vlachoutsikos 1989; Von Czege 1983]. Still others trace the “dogged attention to detail” of the Soviet negotiators as a means of obtaining approval from and impressing their superiors [Lipson 1978; Vlachoutsikos 1989; Von Czege 1983]. According to Knight [1987, p. 122], the lengthy, arduous and detailed nature of the process is a deliberate test of potential suppliers as “they believe that a company that survives a complex and drawn-out negotiating process is more likely to be a good supplier than one that balks at delays.” Finally, Schmidt [1978, p. 14] notes that “philosophically, the average Russian sees no sense in rushing”. However, it should be noted that Soviets have been known to speed up the process depending upon the importance of the object of negotiations [Sloss & Davis 1987; Von Czege 1983], or if they are in the seller’s position [De Pauw 1979].

While asking for much information, the Soviets are often described as loathe to give it in return, that is, secretive. Vlachoutsikos [1986] traces the Soviet penchant for secrecy to their historical and cultural origins. Moreover, Sloss and Davis [1987] concur with Gorlin’s [1979, p. 106] observation that “the secretiveness of Soviet negotiators may be due to a general xenophobia. It may also be related to the planning system, in which information is power and is jealously guarded.” Von Czege’s [1983] hypothesis about the Soviet secretiveness as a strategic tool to control information flows in a bureaucratic monolith is consistent with the views of Gorlin [1979], and Sloss and Davis [1987].

Importance of Personal Relationships

With two exceptions [Gorlin 1979; Knight 1987], the majority of the authors stressed the importance of cultivating personal relationships based on mutual respect and understanding as a crucial condition for successful negotiations and transactions with the Soviets. Such efforts are said to be rewarded with trust and loyalty. Even acts as simple as the opening of offices in Moscow are interpreted by the Soviets to be symbolic representations of friendship [Hertzfeld 1974] and acknowledgement of the Soviet market as worthy by the American firms [Goldman 1978]. While some authors [Dreyfus 1988; Knight 1987; Lipson 1978; Von Czege 1983] speculate that the Soviets are interested in doing business with only large and well-known firms as a matter of necessity and also because of their risk-averse nature, the majority indicated the Soviet preference for “continuity” in business transactions on the basis of trust and loyalty (cf. Vlachoutsikos [1986]).

A synthesis of the extant literature yields the following picture of the Soviet negotiation processes: they tend toward a distributive (competitive, perhaps even manipulative) approach. They ask for so much detailed information that American counterparts suggest questions are used as persuasive tactics (i.e., to wear down opponents), rather than as mere information-exchange tactics. Indeed, little information is supplied in return—the Soviets seem quite secretive. Finally, personal relationships appear to be a crucial part of negotiations with Soviets.

Whereas each of the five hypotheses are stated in a culture-free, generic form, and each was developed based on theoretical propositions initially developed in the West and primarily in the United States, there are some strong reasons to hypothesize that some will hold for negotiators in the Soviet Union. Certainly the literature suggests that the norms of Soviet negotiation behavior favor a distributive negotiation approach. Thus, the inverse relationship between a problem-solving approach and profits (H4) may be more important among Soviet negotiators than among Americans. Moreover, the importance of personal relationships in the Soviet Union should be reflected in a reciprocity (H3) and in a relationship between interpersonal attraction and satisfaction (H5).

PHASE I—METHODS

The data we have collected allow us to examine directly only part of the model presented in Figure 1. In this first phase of the study, we test Hypotheses 1 through 5 for separate Soviet and American groups.

Participants

The fifty-six Soviet participants in the simulation were businesspeople from the USSR. All were attending a management seminar in Moscow in 1989. Their average age was 43, with a range from 25 to 63. Sixty-two percent of the Soviets held management positions in a variety of enterprises, 34% worked in government ministries or FTOs, and 4% represented cooperatives. Most were from Moscow (40%) or other Russian cities (38%), and all were native Russian speakers. Details are listed in Table 1. No differences were found between enterprise managers and government bureaucrats in any of the variables considered here (i.e., $p < 0.05$).

The American participants were somewhat younger, with an average age of 32. The American data were collected over a period of six years in the mid-1980s. Participants included evening MBA students ($n=96$) from two West Coast universities, middle managers ($n=44$) attending management development programs, and sales representatives ($n=20$) from a West Coast printing firm. All were at least 25 and all had at least two years of work experience in the United States. No cross-group differences were discovered among the Americans ($p < 0.05$).

The reader may question the comparability of the two cultural groups based upon the age differences. However, both groups consisted of experienced businesspeople. This is a substantial improvement over most published studies of negotiation behavior wherein undergraduate students (with no experience in business negotiations) are often used as subjects. Indeed, Fouraker and Siegel [1963] reported differences in students' and businesspeoples' bargaining behaviors. How well the Soviet or American participants represent all Soviet or American managers is a separate issue. The generalizability of

TABLE 1
Variables in Phase I of the Study

Category	Variable	Symbol	Description and measure	Mean/sd (range)	
				Soviet (n=56)	American (n=160)
Negotiation outcomes	Negotiator's profits	$\$n$	Negotiator's individual profit level associated with final agreement in Kelley's [1966] negotiation game, range=28 to 80.	43.0/11.2 (18-65)	44.9/11.1 (10-70)
	Partner's satisfaction	SAT_p	Partner's satisfaction with the outcome of the negotiation, 4 items range=4 to 20, Cronbach $\alpha=0.79$	14.6/3.0 (7-20)	14.7/3.1 (5-20)
Process variables	Problem-solving approach (strategies)	PSA_n	Negotiator's and partner's rating of negotiator's bargaining strategies along PSA continuum, 8 items, range=8 to 40, Cronbach $\alpha=0.73$, correlation between sums of the negotiator's 4 items and partner's 4 items=.371 ($p<0.05$)	29.5/4.9 (18-40)	25.2/5.1 (11-39)
	Interpersonal attraction	ATT_n	Ratings of interpersonal attraction, 3 items, range=3 to 15, Cronbach $\alpha=0.71$	12.4/2.3 (7-15)	12.0/2.3 (5-15)
Bargainer characteristics	Age	Age	Negotiator's age, years	43.1/10.0 (25-63)	32.5/9.4 (25-63)
	Experience	EXP/IC	Interorganizational contact—percentage of work involving contact outside the participant's company	52.5/24.3 (0-90)	51.5/30.4 (0-90)

our findings can only be determined in subsequent studies using other groups of Soviets and Americans and other methods.

Laboratory Setting

The negotiation simulation, developed by Kelley [1966], involves negotiating the prices of three products. Each bargainer was given an instruction sheet, including a price list with associated profits for each price level. The participants were then allowed fifteen minutes to read the instructions (i.e., either a buyer or seller position sheet and appropriate payoff matrix) and plan negotiation strategies. The participants were seated across from one another at a table, given final verbal instructions, and left alone. When either an agreement was reached or one hour had elapsed, the participants were given the post-game questionnaire. See Graham [1986] for complete details regarding the simulations. For the Soviets, the simulation was conducted at the very beginning of their seminars to guard against potential biases.

Operationalization of Study Variables

All negotiations and game instructions were conducted in the respective native languages. The Russian translations of the materials and the post-game questionnaire were checked by having the translations converted back into English by a different translator, and then the two English versions of the questionnaire were compared and translation discrepancies resolved.

Two negotiation outcome variables were considered in this study. Negotiator's individual profits ($\$_n$) were derived directly from the bargaining solution agreed to by the negotiators. Partner's satisfaction (SAT_p) with the negotiation was measured using a four-item scale (all items were 5-point, anchored by satisfied/dissatisfied, for example) included in the partners' post-game questionnaires.

Two process-related measures were derived from post-game questionnaires. Each participant rated his/her own bargaining strategies and his/her partner's bargaining strategies on several items (e.g., anchored by solving a mutual problem/self-interested). The scales for problem-solving bargaining strategies (PSA_n) combine four items from a negotiator's and four items from his/her partner's questionnaire for a total of eight items. Partners also rated the interpersonal attractiveness (ATT_n) of negotiators—a three-item scale (e.g., anchored by comfortable/uncomfortable). All scales were borrowed from Graham [1986].

For the hypotheses tests using correlation analysis, additive scales were used to measure each construct: four items were combined for SAT , eight items for PSA , and three items for ATT , as indicated in Table 1. For the structural equation models, a different measurement approach was used. The latent constructs SAT and ATT were modeled using each of their separate items (four and three, respectively) as formative indicators. For the PSA constructs, the eight separate items were reduced to two formative indicators by combining each negotiator's self-rating (four items) and each partner's rating of the negotiator (four items). This approach allows for a degree of disagreement between the two raters without rendering the measures unreliable. Please see Fornell and Bookstein [1982] for more details regarding the usage of formative indicators in structural equation modelling.

PHASE I—RESULTS

Table 1 presents each of the key variables. Means, standard deviations, and ranges are given for both the Soviet and American negotiators. Hypotheses 1 through 5 were tested by calculation of correlation coefficients and explored further using a structural equations modelling approach, partial least square (PLS), as described by Fornell and Bookstein [1982]. Table 2 includes the correlation matrices used for input for the PLS analyses. The results of both analysis approaches are reported in Table 3.

Correlation Analysis

A positive relationship between negotiator's profits ($\$_n$) and partner's problem-solving approach (PSA_p), Hypothesis 1, was supported for the American group only ($r_A=.373$, $p<0.05$).

Hypothesis 2, a positive relationship between negotiator's problem-solving approach (PSA_n) and the partner's satisfaction (SAT_p), was supported for the Soviet negotiators and the Americans ($r_S=.320$, $p<0.05$ and $r_A=.360$, $p<0.05$).

Consistent with Hypothesis 3, a strong positive relationship between negotiator's problem-solving approach (PSA_n) and the partner's problem-solving approach (PSA_p), was discovered for the Soviet negotiators and for the Americans ($r_S=.703$, $r_A=.465$, both $p<0.05$).

Hypothesis 4, an inverse relationship between the negotiator's problem-solving approach (PSA_n) and his/her profits ($\$_n$) was supported for the Soviet group only ($r_S=-.343$, $p<0.05$).

As predicted in Hypothesis 5, a positive relationship between negotiator's attractiveness (ATT_n) and partner's satisfaction (SAT_p) was found for the Soviet ($r_S=.550$, $p<0.05$). This result is similar to that found for the American negotiators ($r_A=.212$, $p<0.05$).

Structural Equations Analysis

As can be seen in Table 3, the PLS parameter estimates are consistent with the correlation analysis for the American data. Partners' problem-solving approach (PSA_p) remains the more important influence on negotiators' profits ($\$_n$). Also, negotiators' problem-solving approach (PSA_n) and interpersonal attraction (ATT_n) contribute substantially to the variance in partners' satisfaction (SAT_p).

However, for the Soviet data, the results are substantially different comparing the bivariate analyses with the structural equation approach. In the correlation analysis, the relationship between partners' problem-solving approach (PSA_p) and negotiators' profits ($\$_n$) is apparently suppressed [see Bagozzi 1980] by the "conflicting" H3 and H4 paths. This limitation of bivariate analysis is quite nicely demonstrated by the PLS results which yield a relatively high parameter estimate for the H1 path (compare .53 with .097). Similarly, the influence of negotiators' problem-solving approach (PSA_n) on partners' satisfaction (SAT_p) evident in the correlation results appears to be either (or both) spurious or dominated by the powerful effects of interpersonal attraction (ATT_n) in the structural equation analysis (compare .320 with .12).

Two results are consistent for the Soviet participants across data analysis techniques. As in the correlation results, negotiators' problem-solving approach (PSA_n) and interpersonal attraction (ATT_n) had the stronger influences on negotiators' profits ($\$_n$) and partners' satisfaction (SAT_p), respectively.

TABLE 2
Correlation Matrices Used in the Structural Equation Analyses (PLS)

		Americans												
		>-----<												
		x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4	x_5	y_1	y_2	y_3	y_4	y_5	y_6	y_7	
PSA_n	self-rating (sum of 4 items)	x_1	<u>1.0</u>	.377	.169	-.008	-.014	.434	.134	-.057	.339	.393	.405	.198
	rating by partner (4 items)	x_2	.163	<u>1.0</u>	.091	.069	-.019	.214	.442	-.024	.092	.192	.119	.059
ATT_n	Interpersonal attraction													
	item 1	x_3	.169	.108	<u>1.0</u>	.452	.472	.048	-.062	-.125	.167	.205	.120	.355
	item 2	x_4	.373	-.122	.291	<u>1.0</u>	.690	.088	.043	.130	.171	.085	.082	.243
	item 3	x_5	.388	-.138	.247	.607	<u>1.0</u>	.053	-.020	.089	.140	.043	.018	.163
PSA_p	self-rating (4 items)	y_1	.494	.191	.387	.177	.179	<u>1.0</u>	.372	.204	.097	.123	.156	.035
	rating by negotiator (4 items)	y_2	.534	.494	.118	.021	.082	.163	<u>1.0</u>	.410	.185	.188	.099	.096
$\$n$	negotiators' profits	y_3	-.210	-.283	-.134	-.101	.087	-.074	.035	<u>1.0</u>	.157	.037	.031	-.016
SAT_p	partners' satisfaction													
	item 1	y_4	.273	.060	.225	.349	.224	.230	.095	.019	<u>1.0</u>	.637	.712	.441
	item 2	y_5	.195	.314	.528	.281	.157	.310	.192	-.101	.560	<u>1.0</u>	.679	.269
	item 3	y_6	.177	.202	.449	.257	.236	.362	.086	-.200	.620	.725	<u>1.0</u>	.298
	item 4	y_7	.160	-.102	.515	.455	.453	.418	-.113	-.022	.307	.366	.377	<u>1.0</u>
		x_1	x_2	x_3	x_4	x_5	y_1	y_2	y_3	y_4	y_5	y_6	y_7	
		>-----<												
		Soviets												

TABLE 3
Hypothesis Test Results, Pearson Correlation Coefficients

Hypothesis		Soviet (n=56)		American (n=160)	
		Correlation Coefficients	PLS Parameter Estimates	Correlation Coefficients	PLS Parameter Estimates
H1: Partner's Problem-Solving Approach and Negotiator Profits	$(PSA_p \rightarrow \$_n)$.097	.53*	.373*	.49*
H2: Negotiator's Problem-Solving Approach and Partner Satisfaction	$(PSA_n \rightarrow SAT_p)$.320*	.12	.360*	.31*
H3: Negotiator and Partner Problem-Solving Approach	$(PSA_n \rightarrow PSA_p)$.703*	.76*	.465*	.42*
H4: Negotiator Problem-Solving Approach and Negotiator Profits	$(PSA_n (\square) \$_n)$	-.343*	-.72*	-.052	-.26*
H5: Negotiator Attractiveness and Partner Satisfaction	$(ATT_n \rightarrow SAT_p)$.550*	.64*	.212*	.30*

* $p < 0.05$. For the PLS analyses statistical significance was computed by using the latent variable correlation matrices as input for a maximum likelihood (LISREL) calculation of *t*-values.

PHASE II—METHODS

The second phase of the study involves an exploratory comparison of negotiation behaviors. Observational measures of conversational content and form are useful for two reasons: (1) They provide insights regarding the potential salience of Propositions 6, 7, and 8 in negotiations between American and Soviet businesspeople. (2) The content measures provide another perspective on the problem-solving approach (*PSA*) construct and differences between Americans and Soviets. These proposed relationships can only be tested in future studies using *intercultural* negotiation simulations.

Data Collection

Of the 216 businesspeople participating in Phase I of the study, six from each culture were selected, on a voluntary basis, for videotaping. The six simulated negotiations (i.e., three American and three Soviet dyads) were videotaped using a wide-angle perspective to capture postures, body movements, and interpersonal distances.

Conversational Content

A primary purpose in this exploratory work is the identification and clarification of useful process measures. Consequently, the discussion in the sections to follow is organized as a "list" of process measures. Associated with each item on the "list" are operational definitions and a brief account of the method of measurement.

The first step in the measurement and analysis of verbal behaviors during the business negotiations is the transcription of the audio portion of the videotapes. This is a potential source of error in measurement. A complete check of the transcripts did reveal some minor mistakes, and these were corrected. Generally, errors in the transcription process were found to be inconsequential. The second step in the measurement and analysis process consisted of translation of the Soviet interactions in which Russian was spoken throughout. Here exists another potential source of measurement error. Both these steps in the process proved to be very time consuming and expensive, thus putting very real limitations on the number of interactions that might be analyzed.

Content Analysis. Angelmar and Stern [1978] have described a content analysis scheme developed specifically for the analysis of bargaining communications in marketing settings. Utterances by participants are classified into twelve categories. The categories and definitions are listed in Table 4. Angelmar and Stern report positive results from a reliability and validity assessment of the system applied to written communications. The present study is one of the few to apply the scheme to transcribed *conversations*. Coding transcribed conversations is a more difficult undertaking; spoken words are the only channel of communication. Transcripts do not include information communicated through other channels, such as proxemics, prosody, kinesics, or facial expression. As mentioned above, theory indicates that these channels also may be important for accurate interpretation and measurement of conversational contributions.

Three coders were employed in classifying segments of the conversation into twelve bargaining categories. One of the authors coded all six interactions, and research assistants (ignorant of the theory and hypotheses involved in the study) coded two interactions (one from each culture) to provide a reliability check. The authors are cognizant of the possible biases involved in using coders informed about the theory applied in the research. However, resource constraints necessitated this less-than-ideal state. Significantly, analysis of discrepancies in coding among the three coders revealed this source of bias to be minimal. Intercoder reliability was 70% ($\alpha=.67$ as in Krippendorff [1982], p. 134), comparable to Angelmar and Stern [1978], wherein they report 66% agreement for coding *written* negotiations.

The content analysis provides another look at the problem-solving construct. Angelmar and Stern [1979] categorize questions and self-disclosures as representation behaviors—the equivalent of a problem-solving approach. Instrumental behaviors, the opposite of representational behaviors in their scheme, are threats, promises, commitments, rewards, and punishments. So we might expect survey measures of PSA to coincide with higher frequencies of questions and self-disclosures and lower frequencies of the instrumental behaviors listed above.

TABLE 4
Content Analysis Findings (*What Is Said*)

	Cultures ^a (units in individual categories as percentage of total units)	
	Soviet (n=6)	American (n=6)
Bargaining Behaviors and Definition		
PROMISE. A statement in which the source indicated his intention to provide the target with a reinforcing consequence which source anticipates target will evaluate as pleasant, positive, or rewarding.	5	8
THREAT. Same as promise, except that the reinforcing consequences are thought to be noxious, unpleasant, or punishing.	3	4
RECOMMENDATION. A statement in which the source predicts that a pleasant environmental consequence will occur to the target. Its occurrence is not under the source's control.	4	4
WARNING. Same as recommendation, except that the consequences are thought to be unpleasant.	0	1
REWARD. A statement by the source that is thought to create pleasant consequences for the target.	3	2
PUNISHMENT. Same as reward, except that the consequences are thought to be unpleasant.	1	3
POSITIVE NORMATIVE APPEAL. A statement in which the source indicates that the target's past, present, or future behavior was or will be in conformity with social norms.	0	1
NEGATIVE NORMATIVE APPEAL. Same as positive normative appeal, except that the target's behavior is in violation of social norms.	0	1
COMMITMENT. A statement by the source to the effect that its future bids will not go below or above a certain level.	11	13
SELF-DISCLOSURE. A statement in which the source reveals information about itself.	40	36
QUESTION. A statement in which the source asks the target to reveal information about itself.	27	20
COMMAND. A statement in which the source suggests that the target perform a certain behavior.	7	6

^aColumns may add up to ±100 because of rounding errors. Total units counted for Soviets were 439; for Americans, 326.

Conversational Form

"No" and "You." Graham [1985b] suggests that the simple counting of these two words may shed light on subtle differences in cultural forms of persuasion. He found substantial differences between the frequency of the use of the word "no" by Brazilian bargainers as opposed to Americans and Japanese. Bales [1950] considered disagreement to be a crucial signal in his content analysis schema. Several authors (e.g., Nakane [1970], Ueda [1974], Van Zandt [1970]) indicate that Japanese negotiators seldom use the word

“no” during negotiations. Finally, Graham [1985b] notes a Brazilian propensity to speak more frequently in the second person using the pronoun “you.” Linguists also report use of the second person in speech to be of theoretical and practical salience (cf. Neu [1985]), particularly so in the Russian language [Friedrich 1972].

Conversational Coordination. Communication theory suggests that when two people are effectively sharing ideas, their communication behaviors—both verbal and nonverbal—will be rhythmically coordinated [Condon 1968; Gumperz 1979; Erickson 1976]. Here two measures of conversational coordination, “silent periods” and “conversational overlaps,” are operationally defined, and findings are reported below.

(1) *Silent Periods* are defined as gaps in conversations of ten seconds or more in duration. The ten-second time period was selected somewhat arbitrarily, but it is a long enough period of silence to appear unnatural to most American observers. The tapes were searched for gaps in conversations of ten seconds or more, and these gaps were noted on the transcripts and tallied (see Table 5). See Shimanoff and Brunak [1977] for a detailed discussion of the importance of pauses in conversations. Moreover, Morsbach [1988] and Van Zandt [1970] comment on cross-cultural differences in the frequency of silent periods.

(2) *Conversational Overlaps.* The concept of “interactional synchrony”—the unconscious coordination of verbal and nonverbal behaviors of two or more participants in a conversation—is discussed at length by Graham [1985b]. One possible measure of this construct is the number of conversational overlaps or interruptions during a conversation. Interruptions are one of the most important structural aspects of conversations (cf. West [1980]). Conversational overlaps are defined here as periods when both parties are talking simultaneously, or when the conversational contribution of one speaker overlaps that of the other. In the present work, the videotapes were searched for overlaps, and such interruptions in the flow of conversation were counted. The number of overlaps (interruptions) by each participant was totaled and divided by the time of negotiation to arrive at values which may be compared across interactions.

Facial Gazing. The third nonverbal variable to be considered in this part of the study is facial gazing. Other researchers have found significant relationships between facial gazing and outcomes of negotiations [Lewis & Fry 1977]. Moreover, several authors have suggested differences in facial gazing behavior across cultures [Argyle & Cook 1976]. In this study, facial gazing is defined as the percentage of time bargainers gaze at the face of their partners. Ten-minute videotape excerpts of each of the six interactions served as data. Using a stopwatch, an observer recorded the time each participant spent gazing at his partner’s face. The method used was very similar to that reported by Lewis and Fry [1977], except that here videotapes were reviewed rather than real-time interactions.

TABLE 5
Findings Regarding Conversational Form
(How Things Are Said)

Bargaining Behaviors and Definition	Cultures	
	Soviet (n=6)	American (n=6)
Structural Aspects		
<i>No's.</i> The average number of times the word "no" was used by each negotiator per 30 minutes of negotiation.	2.3	4.5 ^a
<i>You's.</i> The average number of times the word "you" was used by each negotiator per 30 minutes of negotiation.	23.6	54.1
Nonverbal Behaviors		
<i>Silent Periods.</i> The average number of conversational gaps initiated by each negotiator, 10 seconds or greater, per half hour.	3.7	1.7 ^a
<i>Conversational Overlaps.</i> The average number of interruptions by each negotiator per half hour.	13.3	5.1 ^a
<i>Facial Gazing.</i> The average number of minutes each negotiator looks at partner's face, per 10-minute period.	2.9 min	3.3 min

^aThese data are in disagreement with Graham [1985]. The latter results were reported in error.

PHASE II—RESULTS

The results from the analyses are presented in Tables 4 and 5. For both the Soviet and American bargainers, the majority of verbal behaviors were problem-solving/information exchange oriented—questions and self-disclosures. However, the Soviets used a higher percentage of problem-solving behaviors than their American counterparts: 67% versus 56%, respectively. Another difference becomes apparent when the various instrumental behaviors are added together, that is, threats, promises, commitments, rewards and punishments. Twenty-three percent of the Soviets' statements fell into those categories, compared to 30% for the American negotiators.

The analysis of the structural aspects and nonverbal behavior yielded additional differences in conversational form. The Soviets used the words "no" and "you" less frequently than the Americans. Further, the Soviets interrupted one another with almost three times the frequency of the Americans. There were fewer silent periods in the American negotiations. Facial gazing was found to be similar across the two groups.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Interpretation of Results

The findings for the American negotiators fit well the model proposed in Figure 1. There even proved to be a direct, inverse relationship between a

negotiator's problem-solving approach and negotiator's profits in the simulation, based upon the PLS analysis. Consistent with the hypotheses suggested by Walton and McKersie's [1965] work, more distributive bargaining strategies actually did not lead to higher profits for the American businesspeople involved in the study.

For the American negotiators, a problem-solving approach seems to have yielded substantial benefits. First, partner's satisfaction was increased and second, albeit indirectly, negotiator's profits were increased. That is, as Gouldner [1960], Pruitt [1981] and others predicted, when an American used problem-solving strategies, his/her negotiation partner tended to reciprocate. And when a negotiation partner used a problem-solving approach, this tended to enhance the negotiator's profits. So, for Americans, a PSA seems to work quite well *when* the negotiation counterpart reciprocates. This mediating role of partner's PSA is crucial.

In agreement with Rubin and Brown's [1975] comments, interpersonal attraction seems to have made a difference in negotiation outcomes in both cultures. For the American negotiator, attractiveness was positively related to partner's satisfaction with the negotiation. However, the relationship for the Soviet negotiators, also positive and statistically significant, was substantially stronger. This latter finding is entirely consistent with the several American authors emphasizing the importance of interpersonal relationships in Soviet business.

For the Soviet businesspeople, the results of our simulation and analysis are not so clear. Differences across the analysis techniques are substantial. The relative size of the PLS parameters suggests the correlation analysis results may be biased by the "actual," more complex, structural relations among the several constructs in the study. Based upon the PLS parameter estimates, one must conclude that the indirect influence of negotiators' problem-solving approach on negotiators' profits appears substantial as with the Americans. At the same time, however, the direct negative influence of negotiators' problem-solving approach on negotiators' profits is even stronger! Likewise, the structural equation analysis suggests that the relationship between negotiators' problem-solving approach and partners' satisfaction found in the correlation analysis may be spurious and that only a very weak relationship actually exists between the two.

That is, the Soviet negotiators using more distributive bargaining strategies achieved higher individual profits while having minimal negative effects on partners' satisfaction. This last finding is in accordance with the comments of Walton and McKersie [1965] and the findings of Graham et al. [1988] regarding the Chinese businesspeople on Taiwan, Campbell et al. [1988] regarding German and British, and Adler et al. [1987] regarding Mexican and Canadian (Francophone only) negotiators. This last finding is also consistent with the consensus description of the Soviet negotiators as "competitive" and "uncompromising." That is, cultural norms are usually based

on behaviors that produce desired effects in that particular culture. The results of Phase I of our study appear to support the Lefebvres' hypothesis of a fundamental difference in norms—for Americans, cooperative approaches lead to higher profits; for Soviets, competitive approaches lead to higher profits.

Conjecture Regarding Videotapes

Direct comparisons of the Soviets' and Americans' responses to the questionnaire items were specifically avoided in Phase I of this study because of potential translation or response bias problems. However, the reader will note that the Soviets scored higher than the Americans on the problem-solving dimension. Such a difference is quite consistent with those discovered in the analysis of the videotapes where translation problems are less likely and response biases are not an issue. That is, the Soviets seemed to place more emphasis on problem-solving verbal behaviors (questions and self-disclosures) and de-emphasized instrumental influence tactics (threats, promises, commitments, punishments, and rewards).

The Soviets' use of more questions is consistent with the information-seeking descriptors found in the literature. However, beyond that consistency, the picture of the Soviet negotiation form developed via analysis of the videotapes is quite different from that suggested in the literature. Particularly, the *confrontational* and *competitive* labels do not fit the Soviet emphasis on problem-solving behaviors, the less frequent use of the second person "you" and "nyet" (as compared to the American use of "no").

We can think of three possible explanations for this substantial discrepancy between the literature and our findings. (1) As mentioned previously, the literature is based upon cross-cultural interactions with primarily FTO representatives on the Soviet side. The participants in our study are mostly enterprise managers with little experience in commercial negotiations. Different groups analyzed yield different results. (2) Or, based upon the Lefebvres' several comments, one might predict that Soviets will behave differently (i.e., more cooperatively) in negotiations with other Soviets than they will with foreigners, in particular those from the United States. For example, Victorina Lefebvre [1986, p. 8] states about Soviets, "members of a group feel as part of one entity and can cooperate with each other without losing face. But their relationships with the rest of the world follow the main rule: confrontation." (3) However, our preference is for a third explanation. Others have found interruptions to be key determinants of negotiators' impressions of their counterparts [Neu 1985]. Perhaps the apparent Soviet inclination toward interruptions results in the Soviets being labelled confrontational by Americans. Gumperz [1979] and others report differences in such elements of conversational form have major negative consequences in cross-cultural interactions. Indeed, this last explanation is quite consistent with Propositions 6, 7, and 8.

Management Implications

Based on our study, negotiation processes and outcomes in American and the Soviet Union appear to be similar in some respects. For example, in both cultures interpersonal attraction tended to lead to higher partner satisfaction. And in any business system partner satisfaction is a key consideration, particularly when long-term business relationships are sought.

Alternatively, the difference in the influence of negotiating strategies on individual negotiator's profits is quite marked across the two cultures. Among the Americans, using a problem-solving, cooperative approach yielded better results. However, on balance, a similar approach for Soviets led to lower individual profits.

Managers, both American and Soviet, must be cognizant of the differences discovered and potential problems that may result in Soviet/American negotiations. We cannot give specific advice regarding cross-cultural negotiations—we have not studied that phenomenon here. Indeed, Francis [1991] has most recently described the potential complications associated with adaptation in intercultural negotiations. But this study suggests crucial and fundamental differences in the normative model of business negotiations in the two countries. Where a cooperative approach tends to yield positive results with other Americans, it may not with Soviet exchange partners. While a competitive or distributive approach tends to work among Soviets, it may not with American exchange partners. Moreover, the several differences observed in bargaining behaviors in the analysis of the videotapes hint at potential problems in mutual understanding in cross-cultural negotiations. In particular, the hidden effects of conversational form are perhaps most worrisome.

Study Limitations

Phase I. Our laboratory simulation and the questionnaire data have several limitations and shortcomings. Perhaps the most important consideration is the validity of the principal outcome measure, individual profit. Kelley's [1966] negotiation game and such measures have been used in other studies, but how well the game represents actual business negotiations is problematic. The convenience sampling is also an important limitation. Any laboratory study is open to criticisms related to external validity. Causality is also problematic in this phase of the study. Measurement of independent variables such as PSA strategies was accomplished after the negotiation game, leaving open the possibility of reversal of the causal direction—that is, $\$n$ or $SAT_p \rightarrow PSA$. Finally, much of the evidence supplied for accepting and rejecting hypotheses is based on self-reports and judgments of participants. In particular, the reliability and validity of the process measures used in Phase I depend entirely on the participants' memory and impressions of events.

Phase II. The results of the second phase of the study, of course, are not definitive. The small sample sizes do not allow for tests of statistical significance.

How representative the participants are is problematic. They are all experienced businesspeople, which is an improvement over most other business negotiation research where students are used as surrogates for "real" bargainers. But how well six businesspeople represent a "cultural form" cannot be determined. The value and strength of the second phase is derived from the observational methods used to measure negotiation processes. Videotaping allows for multiple observers and multiple observations *concurrent* with the bargaining process. Thus, the reliability and validity of the process measures developed do not depend on a priori experimental manipulations or post hoc participant self-reports. The methods developed in Phase II are time consuming and expensive (translations/transcription), but potentially fruitful, as these findings suggest. But, the reader must still take care to avoid over interpreting the findings in Phase II.

Future Research

The problem-solving approach is one of the key constructs in the field of negotiation research. It has proven important in our study as a pivotal aspect of negotiation processes in the two cultures. Perhaps the most important substantive result of our work is the indication that the problem-solving approach works differently in the two countries. These issues warrant much closer attention, particularly among groups of businesspeople from countries that are important trading partners.

The results of our study suggest much more work must be done. Theories about the determinants of business negotiation outcomes are not yet well formed. Our findings also validate Pruitt's [1981] comments about experiments versus simulations. Correlational studies such as ours are most appropriate given present knowledge. Our study only begins to address the problems facing international executives. Business negotiations in still other countries warrant systematic inquiry. Knowledge and experience in one foreign culture do not necessarily help negotiators understand other foreign cultures. The importance of specific factors may differ among countries. Other researchers have tried to generalize about doing business in "similar" cultures, but their contributions are limited.

Our study might be improved or extended in several ways. First, larger samples would allow for more statistical power. Second, the performance measure—individual profit in a negotiation simulation—should be validated through comparison with actual negotiation or sales performance. Certainly negotiation skills are important in business and in other interorganizational transactions, but currently we have no way of adequately measuring such skills. Correlation between performance in the simulation and performance in the field would aid not only in the research process, but also perhaps in the training of negotiators.

Insight into the causal mechanisms is limited to inferences derived from quantitative analyses of participants' self-reports and further deductions by

the researchers. An expanded use (i.e., greater sample sizes) of observational methods to measure negotiation process variables is a crucial next step. Content analysis techniques such as those employed here and by Pennington [1968] and Rogers and Farace [1975] or those described by Angelmar and Stern [1978], Bonoma and Felder [1977], and Soldow and Thomas [1984] should be used to analyze either negotiation simulations or real negotiations in the United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries. Then the self-report and judgment measures (i.e., from questionnaires) can be validated against more objective and precise measures of interaction processes. Two obstacles stand in the way of such approaches. First, executives are unwilling to have actual business negotiations videotaped. Second, the expense and time involved in transcriptions, translations, and coding are prohibitive.

The cultural differences discovered here pose the question, What happens during *intercultural* as opposed to the more commonly studied *intracultural* business negotiations? That is, what happens when the negotiation partners are from different cultures? Graham [1985a] and Adler and Graham [1989] report that negotiators' behaviors differ between intra- and intercultural interactions. Few others have considered intercultural negotiations. Though the appropriate first step is developing an understanding of differences in negotiation forms within cultures—for example, the comparative studies Albaum and Peterson [1984] and others have called for—the most worthwhile subject of investigation is intercultural business negotiations. For example, if Soviet businesspeople adjust their culture-specific approaches to negotiation when their client is American, do they adopt an American approach or some third approach? Bateson [1935] provides a still relevant theoretical perspective for studies of cross-cultural negotiations. More recently, Moran and Harris [1982] have suggested that cross-cultural interactions can be synergistic, that is, cultural differences can be complementary.

Because the study of intercultural business negotiations is new, another, more inductive research approach also may be appropriate. Graham and Andrews [1987] have applied methods first developed by sociolinguists to the study of Japanese/American business negotiations. Videotaped negotiations were viewed and reviewed by several researchers *and* the negotiators. All reviewers independently identified short problem sequences for detailed analysis, including verbal and nonverbal coding and consideration of the comments and personal characteristics of the negotiators. The generality of the problems discovered and associated antecedents and consequences then were checked across several other interactions. The primary advantage of such methods is the broad array of theoretical perspectives that can be brought to bear. Indeed, even the naive theories of the negotiators themselves can be considered, as ethnomethodologists advocate (cf. Lincoln & Guba [1985]).

In emphasizing the face-to-face aspects of business negotiations, we obviously ignore a plethora of other important issues and influences or simply summarize

them as environmental factors. Variables such as power relations, short-term versus long-term relations, market structures, and orders from higher authorities have been the subject of fruitful laboratory studies by American management scientists and should be considered with subjects from other countries. Indeed, other methods have also proven quite useful. Tung's [1982] survey approach deserves replication in other cultures. Weiss's in-depth case analyses regarding GM/Toyota [1987] and IBM/Mexican government [1990] negotiations provide still another crucial perspective to our understanding the face-to-face negotiations required in all international commercial relationships.

As mentioned in the first footnote, the context of the study has changed dramatically. At this writing, it appears that the Soviet Union will no longer exist as of January 1992. Certainly these most recent changes—and the changes to come—will affect the behavior of business negotiations in the former Soviet Union. But we also expect that seventy years of communism will have a persistent influence on individuals' behavior as well. Indeed, we collected our data in 1989, when change in the commercial system was just beginning to accelerate. The participants are all native Russian speakers and are mostly from the Russian republic. Thus, the findings in of our study provide an historical account, or benchmark, for both theoretical and practical interpretations of negotiation behaviors of citizens of the former USSR. Finally, one might conclude that our study has raised many questions, while providing few answers about Soviet negotiation behaviors. However, because this is the first systematic study of Soviet negotiation behaviors, such a conclusion should be expected and is, indeed, quite appropriate. Clearly, much more work remains to be done. Future studies using a variety of methods will provide the clearest answers to the questions raised regarding the influence of culture on business negotiations.

NOTES

1. This study was conceived and conducted in the context of a Soviet Union. Data were collected in Moscow in 1989. Needless to say, the context has undergone, and will continue to undergo, changes beyond our abilities to immediately comprehend. The findings of our study must thus be interpreted within the social, political, and economic contexts of the future, whatever they may be. Given this unique set of circumstances, we have decided to maintain the presentation of the study in its original "Soviet" context.
2. At this writing, Soviet *state enterprises* are generally state-owned factories making goods under the control and supervision of governmental ministries. Only recently have privately "owned" *cooperatives* been allowed to legally operate in the Soviet Union. However, laws and regulations regarding commerce and industry are changing fast, potentially making such labels obsolete.
3. Note that these theories, as with most psychological research, are based primarily on the characteristics and behaviors of Americans.
4. Note the antithesis implied in the literature and in the proposed model—Hypotheses 1 and 3 compared to Hypothesis 4.

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